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Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: 
Some Cautionary Notes, with Reference 
to Affirmative Action 
MARK TUSHNET· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has now become the conventional wisdom that many justices on the 
United States Supreme Court are thinking about the relevance of compara-
tive constitutional law to the interpretation of the United States Constitu-
tion. 1 An emerging conservative critique of doing so questions the democ-
ratic legitimacy of the practice. I believe that those questions are badly 
formed,2 but that other questions are worth raising about the (perhaps) 
• Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I 
would like to thank Vicki C. Jackson for her comments on a draft of this article. 
1 Justice Scalia noted the value of transnational comparisons for those who are designing a consti-
tution, while expressing skepticism about their relevance to the interpretation of an already existing 
constitution. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n, II (1997). The issue of affirmative action 
suggests one such design-relevant use of comparative constitutional law. There seems to me reason to 
think that constitutions that contain both a general equality clause and a ban on discrimination based on 
specified grounds will in the ordinary course be interpreted to render unconstitutional affirmative action 
programs relying on the specified grounds. Contemporary constitution designers favoring affirmative 
action might then think it wise to include an express authorization of affirmative action (or an exception 
from the equality provisions for affirmative action programs). For a brief discussion, see Mark 
Tushnet, United States: Supreme Court Rules on Affirmative Action, 2 !NT'L. J. CONST. L. 158,172·73 
(2004} For my analysis, see Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Ccmstitutional Low, 37 loY. L.A. 
L. REv. (forthcoming 2004). 
649 
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emerging practice. In this comment I identify some reasons for caution 
about the use of transnational comparative law in interpreting domestic 
constitutions.3 Some reasons are institutional, others arise from the doc-
trinal context within which particular constitutional controversies arise. 
I emphasize at the start that I am offering some cautionary notes, not 
knock-down arguments against the use of transnational comparisons in 
domestic constitutional interpretation.4 Such comparisons can be useful, 
especially in bringing to mind possibilities that might otherwise be over-
looked or thought too utopian to be considered as part of a real-world con-
stitution. Here Justice Brandeis's observation, "If we would guide by the 
light of reason, we must let our minds be bold,"s seems relevant. And yet, 
I will suggest in conclusion, letting our minds be bold might not lead us all 
to think about transnational constitutional comparisons. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Constitutions combine substantive norms, such as commitments to free 
speech and equality, with institutional arrangements, such as federalism 
and parliamentary government. The substantive norms are implemented 
within the institutional arrangements, and particular institutional arrange-
ments are sometimes more compatible with some interpretations of the 
substantive norms than with others.6 
Perhaps the most accessible example is whether hate speech regulation 
IS compatible with constitutional norms of free expression. Those who 
3 I use the term transnational to refer both to the domestic constitutional law of other nations and 
to international law, particularly international human rights law. My comments do not deal with issues 
of constitutional interpretation when international law is directly applicable domestically, with two 
minor exceptions. First, some formulations of some norms of international law give a "margin of 
appreciation" to domestic legal systems, thereby allowing them to determine what their domestic con-
stitutions mean within a range that can be either expansive or limited. For a discussion of this and 
similar aspects of the interpretation of international norms by international tribunals, see Gerald Neu-
man, Human Rights and Constitutianal Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1863, 
1871-72 (2003). Second, it is unclear whether there is an international law norm, domestically applica-
ble without legislative action, imposing a duty to promote equality. Such a norm might influence the 
interpretation of domestic equality provisions, although whether in favor of or against affirmative 
action is unclear to me. 
4 I believe my cautions are appropriate for all (or nearly all) domestic constitutions, even those, 
such as the South African Constitution, that authorize reliance on transnational comparisons (S. AFR. 
CONST. § 39(1 )}-but for present purposes confine my observations to the interpretation of the United 
States Constitution. 
S New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
6 My thinking about this question has been influenced by my colleague Vicki Jackson, and in par-
ticular her argument that federalism might consist of discrete packages of institutional arrangements. 
See Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 
INT'L. J. CONST. L. 91, 94-96 (2004); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and 
Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 226 (2001). I emphasize that myobserva-
tions are only influenced by her analysis, that she has not indicated whether she agrees with my obser-
vations, and that I actually disagree with aspects of her argument about federalism. 
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favor hate speech regulation in the United States often refer to transna-
tional constitutional norms-the existence of hate speech regulation in 
Canada,7 the existence in some international human rights treaties of a duty 
to regulate hate speech8-in defending the proposition that hate speech 
regulation should not be treated as unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.9 They argue, quite rightly, 
that the fact that modem liberal democracies do in fact regulate hate speech 
without descending into totalitarian tyrannies where the government en-
gages in extensive thought control shows that the mere existence of hate 
speech regulations is compatible with general norms of free expression. 
They conclude that hate speech regulation in the United States could be 
adopted without risking anything other than making the United States more 
like Canada-not, in their view, an obviously bad thing. 
What the argument overlooks, though, is the institutional context 
within which hate speech regulations are implemented. One principle-
among many-that (everywhere) guides the interpretation of constitutional 
protections of free expression is that those protections are designed to 
counteract a tendency on the part of government officials to overreact to 
perceived threats to order. Criminal law enforcement is much more highly 
centralized in other constitutional systems than it is in the United States. 
Great Britain's hate crime statute requires that prosecutions be authorized 
by the Attorney General, a single official. lo Even in Canada's federal sys-
tem, criminal law enforcement is centralized in each province's Attorney 
General. II The risk of abusive prosecutions for hate speech is reduced by 
this centralization and the attendant responsibility for, and public visibility 
of, decisions to prosecute. Compare the United States, where thousands of 
local district attorneys have the power to initiate and carry prosecutions 
through.12 The way the United States federal system is organized, that is, 
7 See, e.g., The Queen v. Keegstra, (1990)3 S.C.R. 697, 698 (Can.). 
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 
20(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 ("Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."); International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 
4(a), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220 (stating parties "[s]hall declare as an offence punishable by law all dis-
semination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination"). 
9 See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:Considering the Victim's Story, 87 
MICH. L REv. 2320,2341-48 (1989) (describing the development ofintemational human rights law in 
connection with hate speech); john a. powell, As Justice Requires/Permits: The Delimitation of Harm-
ful Speech in a Democratic Society, 16 LAw & INEQUALITY 97,147·50 (1998) (discussing Keegstra). 
10 Race Relations Act, 1965, c. 73, § 6(3) (Eng.). 
II Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-34, § 505 (1970) (Can.) (giving provincial attorneys general pri-
mary law enforcement authority); Constitution Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 92(14) (Eng.) (allocat-
ing criminal law enforcement to Canadian provinces upon the grant of independence). 
12 In general, state attorneys general lack the power to displace local prosecutors except in highly 
limited circumstances. 
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increases the risk that clearly inappropriate prosecutions for hate speech 
will be brought. And, finally, that risk is relevant to determining whether a 
domestic constitutional provision protecting free expression should be in-
terpreted to permit or prohibit criminal hate speech regulations. The insti-
tutional context of criminal law enforcement in the United States and else-
where must be taken into account in determining how to interpret the sub-
stantive commitment to free expression. 13 
Institutional considerations also bear on the question of affirmative ac-
tion. Here those questions deal primarily with the way in which constitu-
tional systems conceptualize the relation between courts and legislatures. 
The starting point is the observation that affirmative action programs 
are the legislative equivalent of, or substitute for, judicial enforcement of 
constitutional equality norms interpreted to invalidate laws with a disparate 
impact on protected classes-or, equivalently, judicial enforcement of 
equality norms against private parties pursuant to the state action or hori-
zontal effect doctrine. 14 That is, a system needs legislatively adopted af-
firmative action programs only when its courts have refrained from expan-
sive applications of a constitutional equality norm in cases of disparate 
impact. IS 
The United States Supreme Court offered an institutional explanation 
for its reluctance to make such expansive applications. Noting that race 
and wealth were correlated in the United States, the Court observed that an 
expansive disparate impact doctrine would cast constitutional doubt on a 
wide range of laws: 
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is never-
theless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice 
it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be 
far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and 
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public ser-
13 My argument deals with criminal enforcement of hate speech regulations. Other contexts-
hate speech regulations by school boards and government employers, for example-involve much more 
decentralized decision-making, even in Canada and the United Kingdom.. It might be, then, that Cana-
dian and British commitments to free expression permit criminal hate speech regulation but ought not 
be interpreted to authorize non-criminal regulations. 
14 I believe these points are reasonably well known, or at least reasonably well-established, but 
for demonstrations, see Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and "A New Birth of Freedom ", 92 
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2004); Mark Tushnet, State Action. Social Welfare Rights. and the Judicial 
Role: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 435,435-36 (2003). 
IS It seems to me worth noting as well that, at least in the United States, judicial enthusiasm for 
disparate impact rules moved in tandem with legislative enthusiasm for affirmative action programs in 
the 1960s, and that this collaboration ended as what I have called a new constitutional order came into 
being. For a discussion of the kind of collaboration between courts and legislatures this illustrates, see 
Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and the National Political Order: Collaboration and Confrontation, 
in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch 
eds., forthcoming). 
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vice, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more bur-
densome to the poor and to the average black than to the 
more affluent white.16 
653 
Placing all these laws under a constitutional cloud was problematic, in 
the Court's view, because doing so would give the courts a general super-
visory role over essentially aI/legislation. Or, put another way, an expan-
sive disparate impact doctrine would replace legislatures with courts as the 
primary definers of public policies with disparate impact, which is to say, 
all public policies. 
Note, though, that this argument depends on a particular conception of 
the institutional relations between courts and legislatures, one in which the 
courts necessarily have the last say. I have called this conception one of 
strong-form judicial review,17 contrasting it with another conception, in 
which courts exercise weak-form review. 18 In weak-form systems, the 
courts' constitutional interpretations are expressly offered as simple decla-
rations by the courts, without any implications for the resolution of particu-
lar cases. Alternatively, those interpretations can be overturned with rela-
tive ease, by a legislature "overriding" the interpretations or by a simple 
amendment process. A court in a weak-form system could be less reluctant 
to adopt an expansive disparate impact doctrine because it would know that 
doing so would not necessarily disturb the legislature's primary role in 
making public policy. But, an expansive disparate impact doctrine is the 
equivalent of judicially mandated affirmative action programs-mandated, 
that is, to the extent that the courts have the power to require legislatures to 
16 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,248 (1976); see also Neuman, supra note 3, at 1878 (dis-
cussing the reliance by the South African Constitutional Court on "institutional factors" in refusing to 
require the government to provide a minimum core of social and economic rights). 
1
7 The strength of strong-form review can vary, as it has in the United States. The idea of judicial 
finality lies at the heart of strong-form systems. But, finality should be distinguished from judicial 
exclusivity, where only the courts are authorized to articulate constitutional interpretations. A court in a 
strong-form system might use legislative actions to inform its own (final) interpretation. Or, it might 
acknowledge the power of legislatures to advance constitutional values beyond the point where the 
court itself would go, without conceding that in doing so the legislatures are actually offering authorita-
tive constitutional interpretations. The Supreme Court denied Congress the power to interpret the 
Constitution in City of Boerne v. Flores, invalidating the application of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act ("RFRA") to state and local governments because the Act could not be considered one "en-
forcing" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court. City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Lower courts have applied that statute to the actions of the 
national government, though. See, e.g., Kikimura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001) (stat-
ing that RFRA as applied to the federal government is separable from the portion declared unconstitu-
tional, and therefore remains independently applicable to federal officials); In re Young, 141 F. 3d 854, 
859 (8th Cir. 1998) (reaching the same conclusion). The reason is such applications are plainly within 
the enumerated powers of Congress (the powers that authorize the affected actions), and Congress has 
the power to structure its exercise of its acknowledged powers by referring to the values of the First 
Amendment. 
18 Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2004). 
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act. Weak-form systems that adopted such an expansive doctrine would be 
committed to judicial encouragement of affirmative action programs within 
the constraints of their form of judicial review. Although not logically 
required to do so, those courts would, I suspect, be more ready to uphold 
legislatively mandated programs as well. 
So, to summarize, the constitutional status of affirmative action is in-
timately related to constitutional doctrine regarding disparate impact, and 
that doctrine is closely connected to the institutional form judicial review 
takes. 
Another facet of the affirmative action issue-actually, the same facet 
seen from a different angle-reveals a similar relation between constitu-
tional doctrine and institutional arrangements. The United States Supreme 
Court has never taken the position that affirmative action is constitutionally 
required; its decisions go only so far as to say that it is sometimes permit-
ted. 19 One reason that might be offered for refusal to require affirmative 
action would invoke the characteristics of courts as decision-makers. De-
signing a good affirmative action program is a complex task that must take 
into account a wide range of variables~haracteristics of the institution 
that is to employ affirmative action (schools, police departments, and so on 
through the range of possibilities), characteristics of the pool from which 
participants in the program are drawn, and much more. Courts, it might be 
said, are not particularly well-suited to designing complex programs. They 
do well in articulating clear rules that can guide others, but their typical 
methods~haracteristically, command-and-control-are not good ones for 
developing complex programs for bureaucracies that face ever-changing 
political and social environments, and that have their own bureaucratic 
characteristics.20 
Once again, an approach to substantive equality provisions in a consti-
tution is here connected to a particular understanding of courts as institu-
tions. Command-and-control regulation has indeed been characteristic of 
United States courts. Today, though, there are new forms of judicial inter-
vention, which allow for and indeed encourage interactions between courts 
and bureaucracies in developing reforms that can evolve as both courts and 
bureaucrats gain a better understanding of the nature of the problems they 
19 One qualification: one could take Green v. New Kent County School Board and its requirement 
that school systems that engaged in intentional racial discrimination remedy that discrimination by 
ensuring that all their schools be '~ust schools," which was taken to mean that no school would be 
racially identifiable, to be a requirement that such systems engage in affirmative action. Green v. New 
Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The lifespan of the Green rule was short, and any man-
date it contained for affirmative action never matured into clear doctrine. 
20 I here summarize a fairly well-established critique of United States courts' performance in so-
called institutional reform litigation. A recent example is ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003) (proposing 
limits on court power that would instruct judges as to how and when to apply institutional reform 
litigation). 
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are confronting.21 In constitutional systems where judicial review takes 
one of these new forms, the case for interpreting the constitution to require 
affirmative action in some situations is substantially stronger than it is 
where judicial review takes the form it typically has in the United States. 
I have argued that substantive constitutional doctrine is sometimes 
closely tied to institutional arrangements. Drawing on another constitu-
tional system's substantive approach to a problem like affirmative action 
may be misleading when that approach is tied to its institutional arrange-
ments. Or, at least, someone who urges that we examine that system's 
substantive approach ought to attend to the possibility that we could do so 
profitably only if we also examined-and considered adopting-the rele-
vant institutional arrangements. My sense is that there is more enthusiasm 
for examining substantive approaches than for examining institutional 
ones,22 which suggests some caution in drawing upon comparative consti-
tutionallaw for (merely) substantive analysis. 
III. DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This Section uses an example from Indian constitutional law to de-
velop some cautionary notes about the importance of doctrinal context in 
using comparative constitutional material in interpreting a domestic consti-
tution. The example is the doctrine of the "creamy layer" in the Indian law 
of affirmative action. To simplify the "creamy layer" doctrine: beneficiary 
classes are typically materially deprived and socially subordinated. The 
"creamy layer" of a beneficiary class consists of those members who are 
not particularly materially deprived, and who (therefore) may experience 
less social subordination than other members of the class. In some con-
texts, the Supreme Court of India has said, affirmative action programs 
must exclude members of the "creamy layer" of the beneficiary class if the 
21 Here I refer to the idea of democratic experimentalism associated with Charles Sabel and his 
collaborators. See, eg., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998) (arguing that democratic experimentalism, where citizens are 
enabled to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their own circumstances, is better suited to 
protect the constitutional ideal than are doctrines of federalism and the separation of powers); James 
Liebman & Charles Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of 
School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183 (2003) (describing how 
a combination of movements toward standards, changing goals of desegregation and school finance 
litigation, and state and federal legislation have converged to create a promising experimentalist 
framework for school reform). 
22 For a relatively rare example in the legal literature of an argument using comparative constitu-
tional law for purposes of institutional comparisons and reform suggestions, see Bruce Ackerman, The 
New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REv. 633 (2000). But see Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues 
of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. 
Constitution, 18 CONST. COMM. 51 (2001) (indicating the resistance to such arguments). 
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programs are to survive constitutional scrutiny.23 
Discussions of affirmative action in the United States sometimes in-
voke ideas similar to that of the "creamy layer.,,24 Suggesting the weak-
ness of justifications for including the children of relatively well-to-do Af-
rican Americans in affirmative action programs in higher education, critics 
provide anecdotes of a Vietnamese boatperson rejected while the African 
American daughter of an engineer was accepted, or "the wealthy daughter 
of a black ambassador . . . preferred over a comparably qualified white 
welfare daughter . . . ."25 Proponents of class-based affirmative action, 
such as Richard Kahlenberg,26 argue that such programs are better social 
policy-and are perhaps the only constitutionally permissible policies-
because they exclude relatively well-to-do members of racial minorities 
(the "creamy layer," although Kahlenberg does not use the term),27 while 
including badly-off members of the racial majority. 
Reconciling the Supreme Court's decisions in the University of Michi-
gan undergraduate and law school cases is not easy,28 but one way of doing 
so might invoke the idea of the creamy layer. According to Justice 
O'Connor, the law school's program was constitutionally permissible be-
cause it took race into account as part of a review of an applicant's entire 
file.29 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the undergraduate program 
was unconstitutional because, rather than giving each application "indi-
vidualized consideration," it "automatically distribute[d] 20 points to every 
single applicant" from underrepresented groups. 30 
The undergraduate program had two characteristics that distinguished 
it from the law school program: a large number of points that were auto-
matically awarded.31 But, I believe, the number of points cannot be the 
constitutional sticking point. Justice O'Connor's opinion did not deny, 
23 See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 80 A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477,558-60 (describing the "creamy 
layer" test). 
24 A LEXIS search of the United States and Canadian Law Reviews database on January 8, 2004, 
found nine references to the "creamy layer" doctrine. 
25 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY; CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 44 
(1996) (relying on anecdotes reported in DINESH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION; THE POLITICS OF 
RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS 33-34 (1991), and Joseph Adelson, Living With Quotas, COMMENT., May 
1978, at 27). 
26 See generally id. (arguing for a move from race-based to class-based affirmative action). 
27 Kalhenberg's index indicates only two passing references to India. [d. at 10 (noting Martin lu-
ther King, Jr.'s references to affirmative action programs in India); id. at 131 (referring to a sociological 
study analogizing job hierarchies in the United States to the Indian caste system). 
28 Seven Justices believed that the two programs were constitutionally indistinguishable, with 
four concluding that both were unconstitutional and three concluding that both were constitutionally 
permissible. 
29 See Grutter v. BoJlinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2343 (2003) (referring to the law school's "highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file"). 
30 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2428 (2003). 
31 [d. at 2414. 
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because it could not, that race would be dispositive in some cases.32 Fur-
ther, her opinion found no constitutional problems associated with the law 
school admissions director's practice of tracking admissions on a daily 
basis.33 Despite the admissions officers' testimony that "they never gave 
race any more or less weight based on the information contained in these 
reports,"34 I am hard-pressed to understand why they even looked at the 
daily reports except to make sure that "enough" minorities were being ad-
mitted-and to take some action, for example adjusting the weight being 
given race in the holistic review, if the tracking reports were disappointing. 
Yet, if the weight given race can vary during an admissions season, and 
perhaps across admissions seasons,3S the problem with the undergraduate 
program could not be that race was given "too much" weight because at 
some point the law school's system might give a particular applicant's race 
the same heavy weight that was given to all members of underrepresented 
minorities in the undergraduate admissions process.36 
The difficulty with the undergraduate program, then, was that race was 
a/ways given some weight. In contrast, at least conceptually, the holistic 
review of applicant files in the law school's admissions process might lead 
to the race of a minority applicant being given no weight at all, or almost 
none. Justice O'Connor stressed that the law school program took into 
account a "broad range of qualities and experiences that may be considered 
valuable contributions to student body diversity.,,37 It seems reasonably 
clear that, as Justice O'Connor understood the law school's program, there 
was a real chance that an applicant from the "creamy layer" of a racial mi-
nority group would get a smaller advantage from his or her race than would 
an applicant from a worse-off sector of the same minority groUp.38 And 
that, finally, is how the "creamy layer" concept operates in Indian constitu-
tionallaw. 
In sum, ideas akin to the "creamy layer" concept can be found in dis-
cussions of the constitutionality and policy wisdom of affirmative action 
programs in the United States. Yet, that concept functions within the doc-
trinal framework of Indian constitutional law, whereas the doctrinal 
32 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344 (asserting that the criticism that race would be "outcome detennina-
tive" was applicable to "any plan that uses race as one of many factors"). 
33 Id. at 2343. 
34 Id. 
35 See id. (noting that the percentages of minorities varied from one class to another between 
1993 and 2000). 
36 In addition, the courts would have difficulties if the constitutional rule were that schools could 
give some weight to race, but not too much weight. If twenty points is too much, what about ten 
points? Five? 
37 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344. 
38 See id. (observing that the "Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades 
and test scores lower than underrepresented minority applicants ... who are rejected"). 
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framework of United States constitutional law is quite different. That dif-
ference suggests that the relevance of the "creamy layer" concept to United 
States constitutional interpretation might be rather limited. 
The differences between the Indian doctrinal context and the American 
one arise from the constitutionally permissible justifications for affirmative 
action in each system. Again without exploring Indian constitutional law 
in detail, I would describe the justifications for affirmative action there as 
invoking notions of compensatory justice, notions of distributive justice, 
and the idea that it is permissible to focus on the relative status of groups 
rather than on individuals. 
The ideas underlying each of these justifications are simple. Compen-
satory justice comes into play because individual members of subordinated 
groups are worse off today as a result of the subordination over time of the 
groups of which they are members. Affirmative action programs give them 
something roughly equivalent today to what they have been denied in the 
past.39 Distributive justice comes into play because the shares of social 
goods held by members of subordinated groups are smaller than they 
should be (according to a constitutionally permissible notion of distributive 
shares), and affirmative action programs adjust distributive shares. Finally, 
affirmative action programs are designed to improve the status of benefici-
ary groups relative to other groups, whatever their impact on individuals. 
Yet, United States constitutional doctrine rules out any of these justifi-
cations for affirmative action. The Supreme Court has addressed compen-
satory justice in two ways. Affirmative action programs can benefit those 
who can be shown to have been themselves the victims of discrimination.40 
In addition, affirmative action as compensatory justice is, in United States 
constitutional doctrine, designed to address what the Supreme Court calls 
"societal" discrimination. And, according to the Court, such discrimination 
cannot justify affirmative action programs.41 
39 Or, roughly equivalent to the value today of what they would have accumulated had they not 
been discriminated against in the past. 
40 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) ("If the city of Richmond had 
evidence before it that nonminority contractors were systematically excluding minority businesses from 
subcontracting opportunities, it could take action to end the discriminatory exclusion. . .. In the ex-
treme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns 
of deliberate exclusion."). But see id. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In my view there 
is only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to 'undo the effects of past discrimina-
tion': where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classi-
fication. If, for example, a state agency has a discriminatory pay scale compensating black employees 
in all positions at 20% less than their nonblack counterparts, it may assuredly promulgate an order 
raising the salaries of 'all black employees' to eliminate the differentia1."). Note that Justice Scalia's 
example appears to include the possibility of raising the salaries of an current black employees, includ-
ing those who were not employed when the pay scale was expressly discriminatory. 
4 t See id. at 505 ("To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve 
as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for 'remedial 
relief' for every disadvantaged group."). 
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Societal discrimination might also refer to distributive injustice-
discrimination in today's distributive shares, without regard to the histori-
cal origins of that injustice. Understood in that way, the Supreme Court's 
disapproval of societal discrimination as a justification for affirmative ac-
tion would come into play again. Further, the Court has indicated that dis-
parate impact alone-again, a phenomenon implicating only questions of 
distributive justice-is insufficient to justify affirmative action.42 
Finally, the entire thrust of United States affirmative action law is 
individual-focused, to the point where it is actually difficult to locate a 
citation for the proposition that improving the condition of a subordinated 
group is not a permissible goal of affirmative action.43 But, of course, the 
focus in the Michigan affrrmative action cases on the necessity for holistic 
review of the files of individual applicants merely confirms the individual-
istic focus of United States affirmative action law. 
The "creamy layer" idea cannot inform United States constitutional 
law to the very large extent that the idea is bound up with compensatory or 
distributive justice or group-oriented justifications for affirmative action. 
The United States doctrine now appears to admit only one justification for 
broad affirmative action programs-the promotion of diversity in settings 
where diversity advances other important goals of the institutions adopting 
affirmative action programs.44 Is the "creamy layer" idea relevant to that 
justification? 
Here too some comparative (social) analysis seems relevant. Years 
ago it was said about race relations in Brazil that "money whitens" the 
skin.4S A classic study by Marvin Harris demonstrated how perceived so-
42 Cf id. at 509 ("Where there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified 
minority contractors willing and able to perfonn a particular service and the number of such contractors 
actually engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory 
exclusion could arise.") (emphasis added). 
43 For one such indication from a concurring opinion, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peila, 515 
U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("In the eyes of 
government, we are just one race here. It is American."). 
44 Here my fonnulation tries to generalize beyond the specific context of education in the Michi-
gan affirmative action cases, although it is not clear to me that there are many other settings in which 
diversity would matter much. For example, although I can imagine a diversity-based argument dealing 
with awarding construction contracts, I doubt that the present Court would find the argument persua-
sive. But cf Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("If it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination for 
the purpose of putting together a 'critical mass' that will convey generic lessons in socialization and 
good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate-indeed, particularly appropriate-for the civil service 
system of the State of Michigan to do so."). 
45 Legal scholars have relied on the saying in recent scholarship, although I do not know whether 
it accords with current Brazilian social reality. See, e.g., Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: 
The Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, A United States-Latin Amer-
ica Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1093, 1106~7 (2002) (discussing the idea that "money whitens" 
the skin in the context of self -classification of race by Brazilians). 
HeinOnline -- 36 Conn. L. Rev. 660 2003-2004
660 CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 36:649 
cial class could make ambiguous perceived skin color.46 A simplified de-
scription of the study is this: Harris assembled a number of drawings of 
people with different skin colors, hair forms, lip, nose, and sex types as 
measured by an objective scale,,7 The respondents were asked to describe 
the person in each drawing in order to elicit a response that included the 
drawing subject's race.48 The language of race in Brazil contains a rather 
finely differentiated scale of terms describing a person's perceived skin 
color. The Harris study respondents provided 492 categorizations and each 
of the drawings "was identified by at least twenty different lexical combi-
nations.''''9 The result of the study was that there existed a correlation be-
tween class and race-the darker the skin, the lower the imputed class. so 
This study might have interesting implications for a diversity-based 
justification of affIrmative action. It suggests that, in a society where 
money whitens the skin, the experiences of the "creamy layer" in a subor-
dinated racial group might not be all that different from the experiences of 
members of the dominant racial group. Members of the "creamy layer" 
would be perceived by others to be members of the dominant group, and so 
would not have distinctive experiences of the sort that adds diversity. So, 
for example, a dark-skinned person of African descent driving an expen-
sive car in Brazil would not be stopped by the police more often than 
would a lighter-skinned person of EUropean descent.sl A law school 
criminal procedure class's discussion of the effects of race on police inves-
tigations might not benefit from diversity in experiences from having the 
darker-skinned person in it. AffIrmative action programs in Brazil could 
exclude the "creamy layer" without impairing the goal of achieving diver-
sity. 
Of course I devised this example to make the point that the assumed 
Brazilian experience is quite different from the actual experience in the 
United States. The phenomenon known as stops or arrests for "driving 
while black" ("DWB") is well-known in the United States.52 DWB is an 
"offense" committed by an African American driving an expensive car, 
particularly in a neighborhood where the police typically observe few Afri-
46 Marvin Harris, Referential Ambiguity in the Calculus of Brazilian Racial Identity, in AFRO-
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTNES 75-86 (Norman E. Whitten, Jr. & John 
F. Szwed eds., 1970). 
47 ld. at 76. 
48 1d. 
49 Id. 
So /d. at 85. 
S I Again, this example is qualified because it assumes that the phrase "money whitens" continues 
to describe Brazilian social reality. 
S2 A LEXIS search on February I, 2004, in the United States and Canadian Law Reviews data-
base found 339 articles referring to "driving while black." The most prominent is David A. Harris, The 
Stories. the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265 
(1999). 
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can Americans doing SO.53 Some drivers arrested for DWB come from the 
"creamy layer" of the African American community. So, in the United 
States, the diversity justification for affirmation action programs is avail-
able even for members of the "creamy layer." Or, put another way, al-
though the Indian Supreme Court devised the "creamy layer" doctrine as a 
means of excluding members of the creamy layer from the benefits of af-
finnative action programs, given the rationales for such programs in India, 
including the "creamy layer" in United States affirmative action programs 
is consistent with the only justification for affirmative action the Supreme 
Court has found acceptable.54 
The example I have developed deals with the relation between the 
"creamy layer" idea and the justifications for affirmative action. That same 
relation is relevant to Justice Ginsburg's invocation of the "international 
understanding of the office of affinnative action" in the Michigan Law 
School case.55 Justice Ginsburg echoed international conventions specify-
ing that affirmative action programs should be temporary to support the 
majority's conclusion that race-conscious affirmative action programs 
"must have a logical end point."S6 
On the face of it, though, the connection between the diversity justifi-
cation for affirmative action and the need for an end point is obscure, while 
the connection between compensatory or distributive justifications and that 
need is obvious. At some point, compensation will have been paid, or ma-
terial goods will be distributed in the normatively desired way. At that 
point the justifications for affirmative action disappear, and ordinary prohi-
bitions on discrimination would kick in to invalidate affirmative action 
programs. One might be skeptical about the claim that achieving the com-
pensatory or distributive goals of affirmative action will happen quickly. 
Still, the connection between the justifications and the end point is clear 
enough. 
That cannot be said about the prospect that the passage of time (alone) 
will eliminate the basis of the diversity justification for affirmative action. 
53 I cannot resist citing the logical extension of the "driving while black" phenomenon to what 
has been caned ''breathing while black." See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), 
amending and vacating 195 F.3d III (2d Cir. 1999). Columnist Bob Herbert came up with the phrase 
"breathing while black" to descn'be the case. Bob Herbert, Breathing While Black, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
4, 1999, at A29. For a more sympathetic discussion of racial and ethnic profiling in the context of 
airport security and traffic stops, see FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREO· 
TYPES 175-98 (2003). 
54 I believe that this perception is what underlies the otherwise confusing discussion in Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct 2325, 2341 (2003) ("Just as growing up in a 
particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, 
so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which 
race unfortunately stiJI matters."). 
55 Id. at 2347 (Ginsburg, 1., concurring). 
56 Id. at 2345-46. 
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The different experiences members of racial minorities bring to their 
classes are rooted in culture, and whatever improvements in material 
conditions there might be seem unlikely to do much-as least within 
twenty-five years, the Court's purported "end point"-to alter culture-
based experiences. Indeed, the remainder of Justice Ginsburg's opinion 
might be taken as her argument that the Court had mistakenly denied justi-
ficatory force to compensatory and distributional rationales for affirmative 
action. She cited, among other things, evidence about material resources 
available in their schools to African American children to support her 
claim that "many minority students encounter markedly inadequate and 
unequal educational opportunities. ,,57 That claim fits much more com-
fortably in an analytic framework of compensation and distribution than in 
one allowing only diversity as a justification for affirmative action. 
In sum, Justice Ginsburg's invocation of "international understand-
ing[s]" about affirmative action may overlook the particular doctrinal con-
text within which United States affirmative action cases must be decided. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Learning about the way other constitutional systems address particular 
questions of constitutional law might enhance our ability to interpret our 
own Constitution. I have argued, though, that we must be aware of the 
way in which institutional and doctrinal contexts limit the relevance of 
comparative information. On questions that matter a great deal, direct ap-
propriation of another system's solution seems unlikely to succeed.s8 
Perhaps the best argument for examining foreign experiences with 
problems that parallel those in a domestic constitutional system is that the 
examination may bring to mind possibilities that would otherwise be over-
looked, or may allow us to frame new questions. Even here, though, ques-
tions might arise. 
Learning about other constitutional systems is costly. Sometimes one 
needs to learn another language. Even if materials are available in a lan-
guage with which one is familiar, one must worry about the degree to 
57 [d. at 2348. 
58 In the field of comparative law generally, Alan Watson's work on legal transplants has become 
canonical. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN ApPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAw (2d ed. 1993). Referring almost exclusively to private law, Watson argues that the phenomenon 
of legal transplanls--{jirect appropriation of ideas from one legal system into another-is quite wide-
spread and often entirely successful. [d. at 21, 95-96. Watson's argument has a positive component 
and a negative one: transplants often do something reasonably well, to the point that trying to come up 
with something better is not worth the effort, and legal elites rarely are threatened by private law trans-
plants. He acknowledges that the latter component might not be available in connection with trans-
plants of public law, and particularly constitutional, doctrines. [d. at 8. The relative lack of interest in 
structural issues in recent discussions of comparative constitutional law (see supra note 22) suggests 
that the reasons Watson has for limiting his thesis to private law are indeed correct. 
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which the available information actually captures the underlying reality of 
the other nation's constitutional culture. And, of course, constitutional 
systems are systems, so that even if one has a good grasp on the way an-
other constitutional system deals with a particular problem, one might not 
fully understand the way in which that solution fits together with other 
aspects of the constitutional system. 
Suppose, though, that these cost considerations are found to be small. 
Still, it is not entirely clear that looking elsewhere is actually a productive 
way of coming up with new approaches to existing problems. Consider the 
"creamy layer" idea. As I have indicated, the idea has been developed-
although without being given the arresting label-in domestic discussions 
of affirmative action. I do not discount the value of a label, but I do won-
der whether knowing much more about the Indian constitutional law of 
affirmative action would help United States constitutionalists develop an 
approach to affirmative action that takes the "creamy layer" idea into ac-
count in a productive way. 59 
Perhaps, then, we "let our minds be bold,,60 by studying comparative 
constitutional law simply because the subject has intrinsic intellectual in-
terest, and because knowing more rather than less is generally a good thing. 
The instrumental value of learning comparative constitutional law may not 
be as large as some recent discussions suggest.6l 
59 The idea that affirmative action programs should be time-limited came up in the discussions 
within the Court when it was considering Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978). See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEwIs F. POWELL, JR. 487 (I 994} (discussing Justice 
John Paul Stevens's suggestion during the Court's discussion of Bakke that ''preferences might be 
acceptable as a temporary measure but not as a permanent solution," and that ''perhaps . . . blacks 
would not need these special programs much longer."). Here too, there appears to have been no need to 
consult non-U.S. materials in order to come up with the idea of limiting the length of time in which 
affirmative action programs could operate. 
60 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
61 I include my original foray into the field in this category. Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1225 (1999). 
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